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Book Review
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC,
AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Jay E. Austin* and Carl E.
Bruch,** Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 691, Index.
$95.00.
Lakshman Guruswamy***
This book, unlike many others on the impact of war, deals with the
environmental consequences of war, not the human toll. There can be
little doubt that this timely anthology of twenty-five essays is a testament
to the growth of international environmental consciousness. While the
book seeks to address a cluster of legal, scientific and economic issues
about the consequences of war, it also reflects some of the difficulties
associated with the broad and wide-ranging nature of conference
proceedings. The multitude of areas traversed by this substantial five
part volume include: The Legal Framework, Lessons from Other
Regimes, Assessing Impacts, Valuing Impacts, and Prospects for the
Future.
Any attempt to evaluate efforts to protect nature or the environment
during times of war or other hostilities, should answer at least three
fundamental sets of questions.
First, what are the environmental consequences of war? The degree
of action required to protect the environment during war will depend on
the extent of the harm inflicted on the environment during hostilities.
Second, to what extent should the protection of nature trump
humanitarian concerns during wartime? The possibility of such a conflict
is undeniable.
Third, to what degree might the environment be protected under
existing humanitarian laws? The word environment is hardly mentioned
* Jay E. Austin is Senior Attorney with the Environmental Law Institute, Washington,
D.C.
** Carl E. Bruch is Staff Attorney with the Environmental Law Institute, Washington,
D.C.
*** Lakshman Guruswamy, LL.B., Sri Lanka; Ph.D, University of Durham, U.K., is a
Professor of law at the University of Colorado School of Law in Boulder.
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in humanitarian law.
While the book does not answer these questions in the order posed
above, the first question is addressed in Part III of the book. The
assessment of the long term environmental consequences of war is
undertaken remarkably well by Asit A. Biswas in his paper, entitled
Scientific Assessment of the Long-Term Environmental Consequences of
War.' He addresses the effects of war on land, water, and air in an
admirable and concise manner. Biswas then proceeds to examine how
war depletes natural resources and generates hazardous material.
Additionally, Jeffrey McNeely presents a balanced and interesting
contribution on war's effect on biodiversity.2 McNeely makes a strong
case that because environmental stress is a major source of international
strife and conflict, efforts to conserve biological diversity can greatly
help reduce the potential for war. Two other essays explore the impact
of the Gulf war on the terrestrial and marine environment.
The question of why the environmental damages caused by war are
so extensive as to merit special attention is only contextually or
inferentially addressed in this collection of papers. To answer this
question, one must consider how war-time environmental damage rates
compared to the regular and sustained assault on the environment that is
an endemic part of any industrial society. Furthermore, it must be
determined if war-time environmental damage is so egregious as to call
for special regimes that might result in the dilution of humanitarian
concerns.
The second question originally presented, to what extent nature
should be protected during wartime at the expense of humanitarian
concerns, underlines the importance of thoroughly exploring the
philosophical basis for creating and implementing laws protecting the
environment. Such laws may be able to protect the environment only at
some expense to humans. Any efforts to protect the environment from
travesties during wartime must be a new undertaking, as there are no
successful shoulders of humanitarian protection for it to be built upon.
The dismal truth is that the implementation of humanitarian law has not
been a triumphant exercise, despite the ghastly death toll and human
misery inflicted by wars. Indeed, in the Twentieth Century alone it is
estimated that between 170 and 270 million humans were killed because
I. See generally Asit K. Biswas, Scientific Assessment of the Long-Term
Environmental Consequences of War, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 303 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch
eds, 2000).
2. See generally Jeffrey A. McNeely, War and Biodiversity: An Assessment of
Impacts, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1, at 353.
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of war and political violence. 3 The horrifying human toll of war in
contemporary times has led to a variety of international measures that
attempt to both promote peace and prevent war (ius ad bellum), and
control the actual conduct of hostilities (ius in bello).
Two important ius ad bellum treaties unfold a revealing tale. The
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, formerly known as the General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War,4 sought to outlaw war by declaring that it
"condemn[s] recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce[s] it as an instrument of national policy...
This treaty was relied upon by the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal, better known as the War Crimes Tribunal, when it concluded
that the planning or waging of aggressive war is the "supreme
international crime.",6 Similarly, the UN Charter moved international law
in a dramatic new direction by creating an unconditional core obligation
in Article 2(4) that: "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." 7
Despite these and other treaties governing the actual conduct of
hostilities (ius in bello), human and political actions have thwarted the
implementation of these laws. This has cast an almost hopeless pall over
the actual realization or implementation of these international laws. In
light of the international community's failure to protect humans in times
of war, a strong case must be made for creating a new arena of protection
that stretches beyond humans to the environment.
The editors appear to think that the second question will be
answered because they state in the introduction that the first part of the
book surveys "the ethical, moral, and religious bases for constraining the
environmental consequences of war.'' 8 The task fell upon Christopher
Stone, whose essay is the only one that addresses this question9. Stone
insightfully raises the central question as to whether there are moral,
3. Id. at 384.
4. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
5. ld. at art. 1.
6. Judicial Decisions, 41 AM. J. INT'L. L. 172, 186 (1947) (providing the text of the
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, October 1, 1946,
as provided by Col. Laurance D. Egbert, Editor of the Record of the Tribunal).
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
8. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1, at 8.
9. See generally Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime: An Overview,
in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1, at 16.
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religious or philosophical grounds for protecting nature distinctly from
humans. He answers the question in the negative, after pointedly
inquiring if any treaties recognize rights of nature, or the environment, to
be afforded protection absent human utility.
Stone argues that homocentrism, as distinct from biocentrism,
serves as the motivation for agreements that protect the environment
during wartime. He concludes his overview of this topic by questioning
whether there is any support for a treaty that that would require
belligerents to leave certain ecosystems intact for their intrinsic, non-
instrumental worth, or for the sake of future generations, despite the
human costs of doing so.
Surprisingly, none of the twenty-five essays in the rest of the book
seek to answer this question in any substantive fashion. While some of
these essays are sprinkled with references to "anthropocentric,"
"homocentric," and "intrinsic" grounds for protecting nature, these terms
are not explained or examined in a manner that satisfactorily answers the
question. The only author that makes a pass at this issue is Michael
Schmitt, who deals with the principles underlying damage assessment in
his essay.1°
Schmitt asserts that there are two ways of valuing the environment.
The first, based on utilitarian principles, considers the degree to which
the environment contributes to human well-being through the provision
of food, shelter, clothing and quality of life. The second, based on the
environment's intrinsic value, would appraise the environment
independently of any contribution to humankind. While his effort to
explain the basis of damage evaluation is useful in seeking to understand
how to assess damage to ecosystems and species, such an examination
does not address an even more fundamental question. That question is
whether, and to what extent, we should protect biodiversity or a single
species at the expense of people during a war.
There are also three very distinct theories that provide possible
answers to the question posed by Stone, even though they are not
discussed in this book. The first theory is based on anthropocentrism.
According to anthropocentrists, all nonhuman values, whether in nature
or species must be measured according to what they contribute to
humans. 1 These nonhuman values only possess instrumental, as distinct
from intrinsic, value. 12 The second is inherentism, which sees all
10. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment: Fault Lines in the
Prescriptive Landscape, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1,
at 87.
11. BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS 235 (1991).
12. Id.
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nonhuman value as dependent on human consciousness. According to
the inherentist view, however, human consciousness is able to embrace
values that are neither instrumental nor utilitarian, and can accept ideas
and conduct that do not contribute to human welfare. 13 This view may
also be seen as a form of noble anthropocentrism. The third is
intrinsicalism, which recognizes "values in nature [that are] independent
of human values and human consciousness."
1 4
What separates intrinsicalism from both the anthropocentric and
inherentist views is its position that intrinsic value existed prior to human
conceptualization. 15  It "cannot be supported by scientific or other
cultural resources [because it exists] independent of all experience." 
16
Jurisprudentially, there are some analogies between intrinsicalism and
the foundational or grundnorm advanced by the famed Austrian jurist
Hans Kelsen.17 Intrinsicalism deals with a deontological proposition that
does not admit proof and therefore must be assumed or accepted before it
can properly be assessed.
The existence of these three broad philosophical views does not
mean that law and policy makers, who have the responsibility of
addressing the environmental consequences of war, accept these views at
a theoretical, let alone practical level. Nor is it true that each of these
philosophical underpinnings is made up of isolated and unrelated ideas
that invariably pull in different directions. It is quite possible that policies
concerning the environmental consequences of war may emerge from an
interactive dialectical process engaging aspects of all three philosophical
strands. The policy that ultimately emerges may well express the
"reflective equilibrium" suggested by Rawls, in which intuitive
convictions are tested against the realities of actual situations and thus
give rise to answers that adapt the rigor of the initial principles to the
requirements of justice and fairness.' 8  Despite these riders, it is
necessary to begin the difficult process of canvassing these world views
if the environment is to become an explicit component of the legal and
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. A grundnorm, as described by Kelsen, is translated in the United States as a
basic norm. It is the foundational premise or initial hypothesis conferring validity or
legitimacy on all other norms of international environmental governance. As directly
formulated by Kelsen, "The basic norm is the postulated ultimate rule according to which
norms... are established and annulled, receive and lose their validity." HANS KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 113 (Anders Wedberg trans., Harvard Univ. Press,
2 nd prtg. 1946).
18. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971).
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policy agenda during wars. Unfortunately, it is impossible to escape or
ignore the possible conflicts between human and environmental
protection.
The book is at its strongest when answering the question of what
degree of protection humanitarian laws may afford the environment. It
offers a variety of scholarly and forceful views on the extent to which
existing humanitarian laws might also be utilized to protect the
environment in times of war. Some of the authors assert that existing
humanitarian laws contain principles that can be adapted and
implemented to protect the environment. However, others deny this
assertion and argue in the alternative for specific laws governing
environmental harm during wartime.
In a succinct, cogent, and tightly reasoned essay, Adam Roberts
pleads for abandoning the view that "those very few provisions in the
law of war that actually use the word 'environment' can be viewed as the
centerpiece of legal protection of the environment in war."19 He reviews
the existing humanitarian laws with exceptional clarity, and argues that
these laws, whose primary objective is to protect humans, do in fact offer
a basis for protecting the environment.
Silja Vbneky takes a different tack and argues that some peacetime
rules of environmental protection should apply during war.20 In addition
to those treaties that specifically provide for their application during war,
and obligations ius cogens and erga omnes, he suggests that there are
other rules obliging states to protect the environment during times of war
for the interest of the community of nations as a whole. V6neky asserts
that the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) governing the use and protection of the deep-sea bed and the
marine environment come under this rubric. While his conclusion may
be accurate, it is difficult to see in what way his final category is
different to obligations erga omnes.
The problem with applying UNCLOS to any warship, whether in
times of peace or war, lies in Article 236 which asserts that the
provisions of UNCLOS "regarding the protection and preservation of the
marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other
vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State. .. ,,2 Although Vbneky
19. Adam Roberts, The Law of War and Environmental Damage, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1, at 47.
20. Silja V6neky, Peacetime Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility
for Environmental Damage Caused by War, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
WAR, supra note 1, at 190.
21. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (emphasis added)
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and Thomas Mensah attempt to subordinate this very specific and strong
exclusionary provision to other weaker obligations of a general nature,
such as Article 30 of UNCLOS (requiring compliance with the
regulations of coastal states while passing through their territorial sea),
their effort is not persuasive.22 The better view, despite the contentions
of these authors to the contrary, is that the environmental provisions of
UNCLOS will not apply during war-time.
In his essay, Richard Falk points to the inadequacy of the existing
humanitarian legal frameworks for protecting the environment.23 First,
Falk recognizes that there may be a potential conflict between
environmental protection and humanitarian concerns. He then concludes
that shaping an adequate legal regime to address this question requires a
separate and dedicated effort of major proportions. Such an enterprise
cannot be treated as an incidental application of humanitarian law.
Michael Schmitt offers support for this position, by pointing to fault lines
in the prescriptive landscape dealing with war and the environment.
24
The rest of the book is a worthy smorgasbord containing an
assortment of essays. These essays range from United States civil
liability models for war-caused environmental damage to public health
approaches to environmental destruction in the twentieth century to
human health impacts of defoliants to militarism to the public health
consequence of armed conflict to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Such contributions take their place beside a m6lange of others on
economic methodologies for assessing natural resource damage. The
concluding section, entitled Prospects for the Future, also contains an
interesting, if somewhat wishful contribution, about moving from the
punishment of war crimes toward the punishment of environmental
25
crimes.
While this anthology does not answer all of the relevant questions
arising from the environmental consequences of war, it provides a
commendable and important introduction to an unexplored area of geo-
[hereinafter Law of the Sea].
22. Voneky, supra note 20, at 207; Thomas A. Mensah, Environmental Damages
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR,
supra note 1, at 226, 248-49.
23. Richard Falk, The Inadequacy of the Existing Legal Approach to Environmental
Protection in Wartime, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 1, at
137.
24. Schmitt, supra note 10.
25. Mark A. Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move From War
Crimes to Environmental Crimes, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR,
supra note 1, at 620.
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political importance. Overall, it is a valuable book consisting of some
excellent individual contributions on a variety of subjects related to the
environmental consequences of war. While the book suffers from poor
organizational structure resulting in a lack of analytical coherence, and a
deficiency of thematic unity, this may at least partially be due to the
nature of conference proceedings.
Moreover, there is a surfeit of introductions of variable quality,
including an introduction to Part I, despite the fact that Part I consists of
only a single overview essay. However, these limitations do not detract
from the strength of this book. This is particularly evident in Part II,
which tackles the adequacy of humanitarian laws to address
environmental questions. Furthermore, the editors have succeeded in
obtaining some excellent individual contributions in this large collage of
essays. An informed reader may well benefit from going through the
entire table of contents to find what she is looking for, rather than relying
upon the index alone, or the analytical rubrics provided by the editors.
